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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the effect of the Greek macroeconomic crisis on depositors’ be-
havior. It tests the main hypothesis during that period depositors react more to sov-
ereign risk than to the idiosyncratic indicators of bank health. Using a quarterly pan-
el dataset of Greek banks from June 2005 to September 2012, this paper finds that the 
withdrawal of deposits at the outbreak of the crisis can be mainly explained by the 
country risk variable, represented by sovereign spreads, controlling for bank-specif-
ic characteristics. Market discipline is also present, especially pre-crisis. Results are 
consistent with the existing literature and robust to different estimation methods.
Keywords: Greece, Crisis, Depositors, Sovereign Risk, Banks.
RESUMEN
Este trabajo estudia el efecto de la crisis Griega sobre el comportamiento de los de-
positantes. Utilizando datos trimestrales de panel desde Junio 2005 hasta Septiem-
bre 2012, el trabajo concluye que el retiro de depósitos al inicio de la crisis se expli-
ca principalmente por la variable de riesgo macroeconómico -el spread de tasas de 
interés del bono soberano Griego a largo plazo-, controlando por los indicadores 
individuales de los bancos. La disciplina de mercado también se encuentra presente, 
particularmente en el período pre-crisis. Los resultados son consistentes con la lite-
ratura existente, y robustos a distintos métodos de estimación.
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I . Introduction
The Greek economy has been experiencing a deep crisis since the end of 
2009. Persistent fiscal and external imbalances were the main source of the 
crisis. Greece has been exhibiting high fiscal deficits and high rates of infla-
tion -exceeding the Eurozone average- since joining the Euro. The resulting 
heavy public debt (roughly 100% of Gross Domestic Product -GDP- from 
2001 to 2008) and loss of competitiveness placed the Greek economy in a 
delicate situation that unraveled with the global financial crisis of 2008/09.
When the crisis became evident, depositors withdrew their money 
from Greek banks. At the beginning of the crisis, however, the banking 
system did not show liquidity or solvency problems. This suggests that 
depositors’ decision to withdraw their funds was not directly related to 
bank-specific characteristics, as suggested in the market discipline litera-
ture. Market discipline is defined as a situation in which market partici-
pants monitor and react to bank risk in a way that impose “strong incen-
tives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner” 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s, 1999; Bliss and Flannery, 
2001). Withdrawing the investments when a financial firm is becoming 
increasingly risky is one of the mechanisms by which market discipline 
can be detected (Flannery and Nikolova, 2004).
This paper investigates the effect of the Greek macroeconomic crisis 
on depositors’ behavior. In particular, this study focuses on the impact 
of sovereign default risk. Using a panel dataset consisting of quarterly 
observations for Greek banks from June 2005 to September 2012, the re-
sults show that the fall of deposits during the Greek financial crisis can be 
mainly explained by sovereign default risk, controlling for bank-specific 
attributes. When the whole economy seemed at risk, depositors withdrew 
their money with no concern for the individual characteristics of banks. 
Before the crisis, however, depositors’ behavior primarily depended on 
microeconomic variables as stated by the market discipline literature. 
This case study provides new evidence regarding the importance of 
macroeconomic risk on banks deposits, contributing to the literature by 
showing that this effect is present not only in emerging markets but also 
in countries considered to be more “developed” as Greece. This is an in-
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teresting case because: 1) it highlights the connections between sovereign 
debt crisis and banking crisis and 2) it raises the issue that these crises 
may arise not only because of the country risk itself but because of the 
perception of this risk and that this perception is what frequently defines a 
country’s degree of development. Although the aim of this paper is not to 
investigate this last issue, it could give a future line of research as Greece 
became the first sovereign to find itself in the middle of a confidence cri-
sis despite the fact that the fiscal situation in 2009 worsened throughout 
Europe and the rest of the world, in many countries much more than in 
Greece (Alogoskoufis, 2012). Moreover, in June 2013 Greece became the 
first developed country to be downgraded to emerging market status af-
ter being classified as a developed country in 2001 by the Russell Indexes 
and MSCI. Ultimately, all this suggests that investors, consumers, lenders 
make their decisions based on their confidence in a country and what is 
critical to them is “not the ability to repay the debt but the willingness to 
repay” 1 it. In the beginning of 2012, with the Private Sector Involvement 
program, Greece effectively defaulted on half of its debt becoming the first 
developed nation to default since 1946.
This sovereign default risk, the perception that the country is not will-
ing (and/or able) to repay its debt, not only can affect international mar-
kets but specially can negatively influence the domestic economy and, in 
particular, it’s banking system. This paper empirically assess that Greek’s 
depositors indeed reacted more to sovereign risk than to bank-specific 
characteristics, putting additional pressure on liquidity and capitalization 
of the banking system.
The paper finds similar evidence for Greece as that found by Levy-
Yeyati, Martínez Peria and Schmukler (2010). Using data on the 2000–02 
bank runs in Argentina and Uruguay, they show that the macroeconom-
ic shocks affected deposits despite the relative “good” indicators of the 
banks. Their conclusion is that depositors’ behavior during macroeconom-
ic crisis periods mainly responds to macroeconomic risks. They also show 
1. This phrase was stated by the senior vice president and director of Research of the St. Louis Fed, Dr. 
Christopher Waller during the first “Dialogue with the Fed”- “Sovereign Debt: A Modern Greek Trag-
edy” in May 2012.
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that in the pre-crisis period deposits respond to bank-specific attributes. 
Results are also consistent with the findings of Burdisso, Cohen Sabban 
and D´Amato (2003) that show that the crisis suffered by Argentina in 
2000-01 was unleashed by deterioration in the macro fundamentals rather 
than a bank run caused by excessive risk taking by financial institutions.
Much of the empirical research on market discipline focuses on the US 
and how risks assumed by banks influence on debt prices. Early work in-
vestigated the relationship between bank risk indicators and subordinated 
debt yields or large deposit rates, and a number of recent studies follow 
this same approach (Alton Gilbert, 1990; Flannery and Nikolova, 2004).
A number of papers also investigate how bank risk influences deposit 
quantities. In a recent paper, Berger and Turk-Ariss (2010) find significant 
depositor discipline in both the US and the EU over the period 1997-2007, 
even though they show stronger effects in the US than in the EU. They 
show that deposit growth rates react more consistently to equity ratios 
than to measures of loan portfolio performance. Their conclusion is that 
significant depositor discipline exists, or at least did exist prior to the re-
cent global financial crisis.
Martínez Peria and Schmukler (2001) also find evidence of market dis-
cipline in Argentina, Chile and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. They 
show that deposits respond to bank risk taking; in the three countries, bank 
risk characteristics jointly affect the behavior of deposits. Their results also 
suggest that depositors monitor banks by following a few variables and 
that the relative importance of those variables may differ by country. For 
instance, the coefficient of the nonperforming loans ratio has different ef-
fect on deposits (not only in terms of significance but also in signs) ac-
cording to the regression specification and the country under study. For 
Argentina, Calomiris and Powell (2000) conduct a panel regression analy-
sis for private banks during the 1990s and find that lower capital ratio and 
higher asset risk are associated with depositors discipline in the form of 
greater deposits withdrawal, although not all measures of assets risk have 
the expected impact.
As already mentioned, the present study investigates if the behavior 
of Greek deposits from June 2005 to September 2012 can be explained as 
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a result of the bank-specific characteristics and/or the sovereign default 
risk represented in the government debt spreads. The main hypothesis 
is that during the crisis depositors react more to the sovereign risk than 
to the idiosyncratic indicators of bank health and that this effect was not 
present before the crisis. The regressions results indeed show that this was 
the case: the variable “spread” does not exert significant effect in the pre-
crisis period but becomes significant in explaining the behavior of depos-
its at the outbreak of the crisis. Market discipline is also present, especially 
through assets and equity ratios but not so much through performance of 
loans, consistent with the already mentioned literature. In the robustness 
check Section the variable spread is replaced by the debt-to-GDP ratio and 
results again show that macroeconomic risk has a negative and signifi-
cantly effect on deposits during the crisis; in fact, Greek depositors did not 
react to the high debt ratio until the crisis outbreak in the end of 2009.
The reminder of this essay is structured as follows. Section II describes 
the development of the Greek crisis and how it was transmitted to the 
banking sector. Section III describes the data and empirical methodology 
used in this study and presents the evolution of the main variables. Section 
IV provides and discusses the empirical results. Section V presents robust-
ness checks and section VI concludes.
II. The Greek Crisis
When Greece joined the Euro in January 2001 its economy expanded quick-
ly. The growth lasted from 2001 through 2008 and was a direct result of the 
benefits associated with euro-area entry: lower inflation expectations, lower 
interest rates, elimination of exchange-rates fluctuations and longer invest-
ment horizons. In particular, the initial fall in interest rates and long-term 
growth expectations increased consumption and investment, generating 
positives growth rates and keeping interest rates low until 2008.
The financial crisis that started in the US subprime mortgage market 
and followed with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
produced a negative impact on the financial markets all over the world. In 
the euro-area, Greece was the country with the larger increased in spreads 
relative to German long-term government debt as financial markets and 
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credit rating agencies started to pay more attention to the country‘s fiscal 
and external imbalances. The outbreak of the crisis occurred at the end of 
2009 when a mix of internal and external factors ended with a larger jump 
in spreads and an even higher percent of government debt to GDP.
Gibson, Hall and Tavlas (2011) argue that during the whole period 
2001-2009 the Greek economy was already characterized by growing, un-
sustainable fiscal and external imbalances and that the low-levels of inter-
est rate spreads that Greece reached in the mid-2000s were not justified 
by economic fundamentals. With the euro-area entry, Greece started to 
exhibit low interest rates but also continued to display high fiscal deficits, 
inflation and loss in competitiveness. Figure Nr. 1 shows that the ratio 
of public debt to GDP remained above 100% for every year (except for 
some quarters around 2003-2004) even during economic growth and low 
spreads periods. This high indebtedness was a logic consequence of per-
sistent fiscal and current account deficits and the impossibility to issue 
local currency (Euro) to finance them. 
Figure No. 1: Greek Debt to GDP and Spreads (vs. Germany) 2001-2012.
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Figure Nr. 1 shows that by the end of 2008 the interest rate spread start-
ed to increase. However, the outbreak of the crisis took place at the end 
of 2009 when various factors came together to provoke a jump in spreads 
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and a bigger increase in the debt to GDP ratio. Gibson, Hall and Tavlas 
(2011) remark two main reasons for this market sentiment deterioration: 
first, the newly-elected Greek government2 disclosed that fiscal data were 
misreported, correcting the public-debt-to-GDP ratio and announcing a 
fiscal deficit of around 12.7% when the previous government had project-
ed 6%; and second, the Dubai government announced the restructuring 
of the investment company Dubai World´s debt, which had a negatively 
impact on the world financial markets. Alogoskoufis (2012) adds a third 
reason for this spread’s eruption: the failure of the new government to 
present a credible plan of fiscal consolidation.
As a result of all these events, in December 2009 international credit rat-
ing agencies decided to downgrade the ratings of Greek sovereign bonds: 
Fitch reduce it from A to BBB+; Moody´s from A+ to A and Standard & 
Poor’s from A- to BBB+. Since then, Greece’s long-term debt ratings began 
a downward path, reaching by the beginning of 2012 a rating of “C” for 
Fitch and Moody’s and of “Selective Default” for Standard and Poor’s. 
By the end of 2009, thus, market sentiment towards Greece started a 
steep downward trend. To strengthen market confidence and Greece´s fis-
cal and financial position, the Greek government requested the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund support for a multi-year program under a Stand-By 
Arrangement (SBA). On May 9th 2010, the Executive Board of the IMF ap-
proved the SBA requested by Greece in an amount equivalent to SDR3 26.4 
billion. In the executive summary of the agreement, the Greek economy 
was described by the IMF as:4
• Heavy public debt and loss of market access;
• Weak competitiveness (inflation has consistently out-paced the 
euro average); 
2. Because of the worsening economic conditions and growing public discontent, the Greek Prime Min-
ister Kostas Karamanlis announced on September 2009 that he would ask President Karolos Papoulias 
to dissolve the parliament and call early elections. Parliament was dissolved on September 9th 2009 and 
elections were formally set for October 4th 2009. After almost six years of conservative administration 
by New Democracy (ND), the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) returned to power and George Pa-
pandreou became the Prime Minister of Greece on October 6th 2009.
3. Special Drawing Rights 
4. The information regarding the SBA and the development of the Greek economy under the revisions of 
the SBA were extracted from the publications section of the IMF website: www.imf.org.
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• Need of very large fiscal adjustments and simultaneously internal 
devaluation but bound to limit growth for a protracted period;
• A banking system with sound liquidity and solvency indicators at 
the beginning of the crisis, but under distress caused by sovereign 
downgrading, recession and uncertainty.
The reforms that the IMF program involved, such as tax reforms and 
privatizations, caused deep divisions within Greece political parties and so-
ciety. At a global scale, Greece lost market access and although it started to 
adjust in macroeconomic terms, the continued economic recession and the 
apparent need to extend financial aid to Greece generated strong confron-
tation within European countries. Moreover, expectations of Greece´s debt 
restructuring emerged and market confidence suffered a new shock, falling 
sharply by mid-2011. This worsening market sentiment can be observed in 
Figure Nr. 2, which shows the evolution of daily spreads between Greece 
and Germany over 10 year bonds for the years 2011 and 2012. 
Figure Nr. 2: Daily Spreads of long-term interest rates. 
Greece vs. Germany 2011-2012.
Source: Thomson Reuters, credit rating agencies and international news reports.
It could be considered that around July 2011 the Greek crisis reached 
a new stage where spreads changed their upward trend (Figures Nr. 1 
and 2), peaking more than 3500 basis points in the beginning of 2012. This 
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marked deterioration in the market’s reaction took form while the need 
for restructuring the Greek sovereign debt became more and more evident 
and as the political and social situation of the country grew weaker. Figure 
Nr. 2 notes the main events that occurred between mid-2011 and 2012, 
which are summarized below.
In July 2011 European leaders reached the required consensus to con-
tinue their financial support to Greece with the aim to restore its market 
access, but with the condition that their program be implemented. The 
debate about extending financial aid to Greece also involved public dis-
cussions about options for a Private Sector Involvement program (PSI). 
After an initial proposal of the PSI and subsequent revisions by Eurogroup 
members, bank representatives from the IIF (a group representing the 
world’s largest banks) and the IMF staff as observers, European partners 
agreed on the key targets of the PSI operation. In October 2011 a modified 
PSI was adopted –envisaging a significant reduction in the face value of 
the Greek sovereign debt– together with an ambitious program of struc-
tural reforms for the Greek economy, aimed at bringing down the Greek 
debt-to-GDP ratio to 120% by 2020. The PSI was successfully completed in 
April 2012 with a participation rate that surprisingly reached 96.9% of the 
total out-standing amount of eligible bonds. The PSI program ultimately 
meant a default on Greek debt; investors “voluntary” accepted to take 50% 
cut in the face value of their bonds.
The weak economic situation went hand-in-hand with social and politi-
cal unrest. Social protests and strikes became frequent as the new auster-
ity measures and structural reforms for growth recovery were expanding. 
On October 31st 2011, the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Papandreou, pro-
posed a referendum to openly approve the additional financial aid that the 
Eurozone agreed to offer Greece. Faced with a storm of criticism over the 
referendum, Papandreou had to withdraw it and announced his resigna-
tion. As a result of this political conflict, a national unity government was 
formed by the beginning of November 2011. In November 17th, under the 
commemoration of the revolutionary organization, at least fifty thousand 
Greeks joined a protest that represented the first public test of the new 
national unity government. In May 2012, the first early parliamentary elec-
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tions took place but the three top-ranking parties failed to form a working 
coalition and President Papoulias called new elections for June 17th, 2012. 
The parliamentary elections of June boosted New Democracy, albeit leav-
ing it without a majority. Finally, leader Antonis Samaras became the new 
Prime Minister of Greece and assembled a coalition with third-placed PA-
SOK and smaller groups to pursue the austerity program.
Banking Sector´s behavior
The economic crisis affected the banking sector via many channels, the more 
important being the cut-off from international financial markets; the out-
flow of deposits; the deterioration of asset quality as a result of worsen-
ing economic conditions; and the restructuring of the Greek sovereign debt 
through the Private Sector Involvement (PSI) program.
In particular, the process of restructuring the Greek sovereign debt en-
tailed the exchange of Greek Government Bonds (GGBs) with a series of 
new bonds, at a significant price discount. In the context of the PSI, Greek 
banks exchanged GGBs and state-related loans of a total face amount of 
€48.6 billion, for New Bonds issued by the Hellenic Republic and PSI Pay-
ment Notes issued by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)5. 
For the Greek banking sector, the losses in net present value amounted 
to €37.7 billion, out of which €5.8 billion had already been recorded on 
the June 2011 financial statements. Before the massive acceptance of the 
bond swap, in December 2011 the aggregate capital of the credit institu-
tions amounted €53,067 millions. Considering these values, the losses de-
rived from the PSI exchange program represented more than 70% of the 
system’s equity.
Banks´ financial profiles were severely affected by the pressure on li-
quidity and capital put by these factors. To respond to these pressures, 
the Bank of Greece took a prominent role in providing emergency liquid-
ity assistance (ELA) and a process of recapitalizating and restructuring 
of the banking system is already underway. Regarding capitalization, the 
strategy followed by the Bank of Greece was to identify four “core banks”, 
5. Bank of Greece, Report on the Recapitalisation and Restructuring of the Greek Banking Sector, De-
cember 2012.
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namely National Bank of Greece, Eurobank, Alpha Bank and Piraeus Bank, 
which were eligible for recapitalization using public funds, and “non-core 
banks” needed to be recapitalized by the private sector or, otherwise, to 
be resolved. 
At the time of writing, some commercial banks in Greece had already 
been merged with or acquired by core banks, and other are in the process 
of being resolved. Between 2011 and the beginning of 2013: the largest 
public bank ATE was resolved through an acquisition by Piraeus Bank; 
two smaller banks were acquired by two core banks (Emporiki and GE-
NIKI by Alpha Bank and Piraeus Bank, respectively); another small bank 
was resolved with state financial aid (Proton Bank) and the Hellenic Post-
bank was resolved as a new bank capitalized by the Hellenic Financial 
Stability Fund (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). After this crisis, clearly, the 
structure of the banking sector will not be the same.
The next section is dedicated to the description of the empirical meth-
odology we employ to test the main hypothesis and to describe in more 
detail the banking sector´s behavior. The evolution of the main variables 
identified in this section, the database and the regressions specifications 
are described in the next section in order to answer the following key 
questions: 
• How did the crisis affect banks’ indicators? 
• Was the decision of depositors to withdraw their funds made be-
fore or after the deterioration of these indicators? 
• Did depositors react more to the sovereign risk (represented by the 
long-term debt spreads) than to specific-bank characteristics when 
the crisis started? 
• If they responded to “liquidity and solvency” indicators before the 
crisis, did they also respond at the time of the crisis? 
III. Data and Methodology
III.1. Sample
The bank-level database in this study includes 12 commercial banks operat-
ing in Greece which represent approximately 80% of the banking system. 
The decision to include these banks relies on their importance within the 
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA DE BUENOS AIRES 120  |
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
system and data availability. At the end of 2011 only five of these banks had 
a total of € 283 billion in assets, accounting for 60% of total credit institu-
tions assets. In December 2010 (before the PSI), these five banks held 61% of 
the Government Securities held by credit institutions, other than shares and 
derivatives. For these banks, on average, the ratio of these government secu-
rities to assets was 10% and to equity was 222%6. For the aggregate of credit 
institutions these Government Securities –other than shares and derivatives 
– accounted for 10% of total assets and 104% of capital and reserves. Appen-
dix Table A.1 shows the banks included in the sample. 
Data come directly from banks’ balance sheets and income statements. 
The database is quarterly as available public information is released every 
three months. The period covers 30 quarters from June 2005 to September 
2012 in order to include the pre-crisis and the crisis period.
The data also include ownership information from the statements 
reports and Bankscope dataset to control for mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) that occurred during the whole period. The bank-quarter observa-
tions in which M&A were concluded are treated as missing points7. The 
main changes in ownership and the mergers deals of the period are also 
presented in the Appendix Table A.1.
Given the main focus of how sovereign risk affects deposits, regres-
sions also include macroeconomic data as independent variables. The core 
measure of country risk is the spread on Greek sovereign bonds over Ger-
man comparable bonds provided by Thomson Reuters dataset and OECD.
Stat. To consistently merge with the bank quarterly database, spreads are 
calculated as the quarter average of the daily difference between the 10-
year sovereign bonds yields of Germany and Greece.
The rest of the macroeconomic variables were collected from Euro-
stat and OECD.Stat. The information about the whole financial system of 
6. If the fifth largest bank –Agricultural bank of Greece-, which was publicly owned until 2012, is not 
taken into account, the average ratio of government securities (other than shares and derivatives) to 
equity drops to 154%.
7. In particular, the observation treated as missing points were: Piraeus Bank in September 2012 as in 
July 2012 it absorbed Agricultural Bank of Greece, thus, since September it represents a “new” bank; 
and Proton Bank in September 2006 as it was the result of a merger between Proton Investment Bank, 
Omega Bank and Proton Securities. The banks that were acquired by other banks remain in the database 
with observations until the last publicly available financial statement.
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Greece, including the recapitalization and restructuring of the banking 
system, was obtained from the website of the Bank of Greece.
III.2. Empirical Methodology
The main hypothesis of this study is that during the Greek crisis deposi-
tors react more to sovereign risk than to bank-level indicators. To test it, 
the following panel specification is estimated:
Di,t = αi + β * SPREADt + δ * BANKi,t-1 + εi,t (1)
εi,t ~ N (0, σ 2i,t)
Where D is the log of time deposits, each observation corresponding to 
total customer deposits that bank i has at quarter t; the variable SPEAD is 
the country risk that changes over time but not across banks; and BANK is 
a vector of bank-specific characteristics that changes over banks and time. 
The sovereign default risk is usually measured as the spread of interest 
rates. Thus, in the baseline estimations, this risk is measured by the variable 
SPEAD: the interest-rate spread between 10-year Greek and German gov-
ernment bonds. For robustness check, other regressions replace SPREAD 
with the debt-to-GDP ratio and a dummy variable that takes into account 
the completion of the PSI program, as spreads are expected to be influenced 
by fundamentals and the probability of default. The vector BANK includes a 
number of bank-level variables and ratios that are mainly derived from the 
CAMEL rating system of banks and controls for size, capital adequacy, as-
sets quality, earnings and liquidity. Description and averages of these vari-
ables’ pre-crisis and during crisis values are reported on Table Nr. 1. 
It is worth mentioning that for asset quality the typical ratio of non-per-
forming loans (NPLs) is not used here because of data availability. Many of 
the public available financial statements are not presented in much detail so 
it was not possible to obtain the amount of impairment on loans for all the 
banks. In the Bankscope dataset there are also very few observations for the 
variable NPLs for the banks and years considered in this sample. Instead, 
this paper uses a more comprehensive ratio regarding the quality of assets 
as “Impairment charges for credit losses” includes not only the charges from 
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non-performing loans but also the losses derived from holding government 
securities after the outbreak of the crisis. The ratio divides the impairment 
charges over total assets instead of over total loans as the government debt 
is computed in other assets than loans, such as investments.
Table Nr. 1: Variable definition and Descriptive Statistics
Variables Definition
Pre-crisis 
Q2-2005 –Q2-2009
Crisis 
Q3-2009 –Q3-2012
Average Std Dev Average Std Dev
Assets Log of total assets 16.542 1.307 16.902 1.211
Equity_assets Equity to total assets ratio (%) 6.955 5.904 5.635 3.232
Impair_assets
Impairment charges for credit 
losses to total assets (%)
0.599 0.396 2.479 2.653
ROAA (Return 
on assets ratio)
Ratio of net interest income to 
total assets (%)
2.408 0.519 2.073 0.590
Liquid_assets
Liquid assets - cash and 
balances with central banks - to 
total assets ratio (%)
3.200 1.332 2.667 1.289
In equation (1) bank-specific variables are lagged one period to account 
for the fact that depositors have access to financial information with cer-
tain delay. The estimation of (1) includes fixed effects to consistently esti-
mate the parameters if αi were correlated with εit. In this way, this estima-
tion assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity of the individual banks is 
constant over time and can be correlated with the independent variables. 
The decision to estimate under a fixed effects model is related to the post-
estimation analysis. Estimating Eq. (1) with different control sets and with 
fixed effects (FE) gives roughly the same results than estimating the same 
specifications with random effects (RE).8 Even so, after estimating both 
models, a Hausman test was applied and the null hypothesis was rejected 
with high significance level. Thus, it seemed preferable to estimate with 
FE since RE could give inconsistent estimators.
The equation is also estimated by dividing the sample in two periods: 
pre crisis and crisis and, as robustness check, by using other variables than 
8. The only variable that changes signs between FE and RE estimations was ROAA.
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“spread” to control for the sovereign risk and also by accounting for types 
of ownership (foreign and no foreign banks). All these results are present-
ed in sections IV and V.
III.3. Evolution of key variables
Before the empirical estimation of Eq. (1) it is important to take a closer look 
at the key variables included in that equation. The dependent variable is the 
log of deposits and the independent variable of main interest is the spread of 
yields on Greek over German long-term bonds, which represents the coun-
try risk. Figure Nr. 3 shows the inverse relation between these two variables.
Figure Nr. 3: Deposits vs. Spreads 2005-2012.
Source: OECD. Stats, Thomson Reuters and Banks Financial Statements.
The variable “Total Deposits” is the sum of the twelve banks costumer 
deposits. It shows a downward trend since end of 2009 that accelerates 
by mid-2011. Between March 2010 and March 2011, depositors withdrew 
their funds at an average monthly rate of approximately 1%, represent-
ing a 12-month percentage change of -11%. By the end of 2011 the annual 
withdrawal rate reached 18% and in July 2012 climbed to 22%. 
In turn, Figure Nr. 3 shows that the spread of Greek over German long-
term bond started its upward trend by the end of 2009 and presented its 
maximum quarter average value in March 2012 when it reached 2941 ba-
sis points. It also stresses a very close inverse relationship between the 
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spreads and depositors’ behavior; their correlation coefficient is -0.427, 
which is significant at the 5% level. Moreover, as shown in Figure Nr. 1, 
spreads move in close relation with public debt, with a highly significant 
correlation coefficient of 0.813 for the whole period 2001-2012. Thus, this 
may be a first sign that depositors do react to sovereign risk.
It is also important to plot total deposits versus the mean of the bank-
level variables to see if a direct relationship like deposits vs. spreads may 
also be observed between deposits and bank ratios. Figures Nr. 4 to 8 in-
dicate that the connection is not as clear between deposits and banking 
indicators as in the case of spreads. Most of the variables show a volatile 
behavior and a deterioration of their values some months after the bank 
run started at the beginning of 2010.
Figure Nr. 4: Deposits vs. Assets 2005-2012
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The deterioration in bank-level indicators is related to the way the crisis 
developed and impacted on the banking sector, described in the previous 
section. With the discussions of Private Sector Involvement, since approxi-
mately the second quarter of 2011, banks were forced to recognize large 
losses on bonds and consequently their impairment-charges-for-credit-
losses ratio sharply increased and their profitability became under strong 
pressure (Figures Nr. 6 and 7). With the acceptance of the PSI and the 
exchange of GGBs in the first quarter of 2012, banks proceeded to the full 
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derecognizing9 of the old securities and loans and the recognition of the 
new securities received from the exchange, which generated a decrease in 
the impairment ratio.
Figure Nr. 5: Deposits vs. Equity/Assets 2005-2012.
Source: Banks Financial Statements.
Figure Nr. 6: Deposits vs. Impairment/Assets 2005-2012.
Source: Banks Financial Statements.
9. In April 2012, the IFRS Interpretations Committee received a request for guidance on the accounting 
for several aspects of the restructuring of Greek Government Bonds. Regarding the derecognition of 
the financial assets, the Committee concluded that the transaction would result in derecognition, as 
established in the International Accounting Standard 39. “Derecognition” is defined by the IAS 39 as 
the removal of a previously recognised financial asset or financial liability from an entity’s statement of 
financial position. After this derecognition, the Greek banking sector had to absorb losses that amounted 
to €37.7 billion in net present value. 
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Figure Nr. 7: Deposits vs ROAA 2005-2012.
Source: Banks Financial Statements.
Figure Nr. 8: Deposits vs. Liquid Assets ratio 2005-1012.
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The losses absorbed by banks as a result of their heavy exposure to 
Greek government bonds produced drastic drops in the ROAA and Eq-
uity ratios since the end of 2011. As can be seen in Figures Nr. 5 and 7, 
these declines started after the beginning of deposits withdrawals. This 
would mean that depositors reacted to the troubled situation of the Greek 
economy even before banks’ financial profiles started to weaken.
Moreover, liquidity ratios worsened as deposit withdrawals increased. 
Even though the mean of the liquidity to assets ratio seems volatile (Fig-
ure Nr. 8), its first important fall is observed in the first quarter of 2010, 
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after depositors started their reaction with the crisis outbreak by the end of 
2009. Then, the ratio reaches its minimum point in the first quarter of 2012, 
after depositor confidence was severely undermined by the public discus-
sions of PSI and by the uncertainty related to political and social conflicts 
(the “new” phase of the crisis).
As previously said, and only by looking at the evolution of the key 
variables, it seems that in fact Greek depositors decided to withdraw their 
funds in response more to the increase in sovereign risk than to the dete-
rioration in bank-level characteristics, at least at the beginning of the crisis. 
Equation (1) formally tests this. Results are discussed in the next section.
IV. Results
Table Nr. 2 presents the estimation results of Equation (1) with bank 
fixed effects. Column (1) shows the results for the whole database and 
columns (2) and (3) report separate estimations for the pre-crisis and the 
crisis period. Consistent with the crisis description of section II, the “cri-
sis period” is considered to begin by the end of 2009. However, as seen 
from the above figures, the crisis effect on deposits seemed to be more 
severe since the middle of 2011. As also described in section II, since 
June 2011 the Greek banking sector started a restructuring process fol-
lowing the PSI program and the need to recapitalize it by public or pri-
vate funds. This is the reason for the division between two sub-periods: 
column (4) presents the results from September 2009 to March 2011 and 
column (5) from June 2011 to September 2012. Although the number of 
observations (and banks) clearly falls in columns (4) and (5), especially 
in column (5) as a result of the restructuring process, it may be useful to 
compare these results with the whole period of crisis and to see if there 
are two different stages regarding the effect of variables on deposits dur-
ing the Greek crisis.
Column (1) in Table Nr. 2 shows that the spread has a negative and 
significant impact on depositors’ behavior. Also, bigger and better capital-
ized banks attract more deposits, while earnings (measured by ROAA) 
and liquidity ratios do not seem to exert a significant effect on Greek de-
positors over the whole period.
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As Levy-Yeyati, Martínez Peria and Schmukler (2010) document for 
Argentina and Uruguay, these results support the importance of macro-
economic risk during the crisis period for the case of Greece too. The effect 
of spread on deposits is not significant in the pre-crisis period (column 
(2)) but is highly significant during the crisis, especially before mid-2011 
(column (4)) when banks had not yet absorbed the effects of the crisis nor 
started their restructuring process. For this period, an increase of Greek 
spreads of one unit -of basis points- implies a decline in deposits of ap-
proximately 1.3%.
Table Nr. 2: Greek Deposits reaction to 
macroeconomic risk and bank-level variables
 Total period2005-2012
Pre-crisis
Q2.2005–
Q2.2009
Crisis
Q3.2009–
Q3.2012
Q3.2009 –
Q1.2011
Q2.2011 –
Q3.2012
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Log of deposits
Log of 
deposits
Log of 
deposits
Log of 
deposits
Log of 
deposits
Spread -0.011*** -0.007 -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.004
 [-3.136] [-0.311] [-3.179] [-4.868] [-1.733]
Assets 0.690*** 0.751*** 0.780*** 0.617*** 0.524**
 [7.212] [10.900] [6.096] [3.271] [2.555]
Equity_assets 0.011*** 0.012 0.008** -0.004 0.013***
 [3.681] [1.704] [2.372] [-1.150] [5.733]
Impair_assets -0.006 -0.048** 0.006 -0.003 0.006*
 [-0.767] [-2.216] [1.776] [-0.455] [2.247]
ROAA 0.060 0.032 -0.081* -0.015 -0.041
 [1.049] [0.870] [-1.890] [-0.237] [-0.647]
Liquid_assets -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 0.007* 0.005
 [-0.812] [-1.271] [-0.250] [1.969] [0.306]
Constant 4.573** 3.668** 3.287 5.951* 7.508*
 [2.662] [2.957] [1.516] [1.854] [2.209]
 
Observations 254 142 112 78 34
R-squared 0.703 0.817 0.851 0.675 0.847
Nº of banks 12 12 12 12 10
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Note: Bank-specific variables are taken from Greek banks quarterly financial statements and lagged 
one period (except for deposits). Greece vs. Germany spreads are calculated from Thomson Reuters 
daily series. Regressions are fixed effects with robust standard errors. T-statistics are in brackets. 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 
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During the whole period, sovereign risk explained 55% of the change 
in deposits. It represented 23% in the pre-crisis period and 75% between 
September 2009 and March 2011. These percentages were calculated as 
the ratio between 1 minus the adjusted R2 of the regression without the 
spread (only with bank-level characteristics as independent variables) and 
the adjusted R2 of the complete regression (including the spreads). Table 
Nr. 3 presents these values and the resulting variance explained by coun-
try risk for regressions (1) to (4). Regression (5) is not presented because it 
includes too few observations so the R2 may not be reliable. The adjusted 
R-square coefficients show that during crisis the joint significance of the 
bank-level variables falls (1- R2 of the regression with only bank charac-
teristics grows) and country risk becomes more significant to explain the 
behavior of deposits.
Table Nr. 3: Percentage explained by Country Risk 
(spreads) pre and during crisis
Total Period
2005-2012
Pre-crisis
Q2-05 –Q2-09
Crisis
Q3-09 -Q3-12
Crisis I
Q3-09 -Q1-11
Explained by 
country risk
Explained by 
country risk
Explained by 
country risk
Explained by 
country risk
1- R2within with only bank char. 38%
55%
19%
23%
25%
30%
49%
75%
R2within reg. including spread 70% 81% 84% 65%
Regarding the bank-level variables and the existence of market disci-
pline, Table Nr. 2 sustains the “too big to fail” hypothesis as the largest 
banks in terms of their assets gained deposits. The impact of other vari-
ables depends of the period under analysis. For example, at the beginning 
of the crisis depositors did not withdraw their funds from more liquid 
institutions; however, this effect disappeared as the crisis developed. 
The ratio of impairment charges for credit losses to total assets was 
significant for depositors before the crisis (Table Nr. 2, column (2)). How-
ever, during the crisis its coefficient changed signs and significance. The 
volatile behavior of this ratio during the crisis is related to the fact that at 
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the outbreak of the crisis all banks -and in particular the five larger banks- 
strongly increased their exposure to credit risk from the Greek Govern-
ment debt and then reduced it as a consequence of the Greek banking sec-
tor restructuring process. As explained before, because of the discussions 
about PSI, since mid-2011, and until the completion of the program, Greek 
banks had to recognize large amounts of impairment charges with respect 
to the exchanged Greek government bonds and loans. Banks involvement 
in the PSI exchanged those charges for the impairments of new bonds and, 
consequently, provoked a large negative impact on their equity and capi-
tal adequacy. Figures Nr. 5 and 6 depict these behaviors, with equity to as-
sets ratio dropping during the crisis and impairment charges ratio peaking 
in the year 2011 and then suddenly falling after completion of the program 
in the first quarter of 2012. Overall, the effect of the asset quality indicator 
on deposits is volatile; its sign and significance change across specifica-
tions, as other studies have shown (Calomiris and Powell, 2000; Martínez 
Peria and Schmukler, 2001).
Regarding capitalization, the equity-to-assets ratio has a positive and 
significant effect on deposits, for the whole period and also during the 
crisis. This is consistent with the findings of Berger and Turk-Ariss (2010) 
that depositors react more to equity ratios than to measures of portfolio 
performance. It is also consistent with the work of Levy-Yeyati, Martínez 
Peria and Schmukler (2010), where the capital-to-assets ratio became sig-
nificant during crisis for the log of dollar time deposits in Argentina. 
To sum up, the outbreak of the Greek macroeconomic crisis, whose 
risk is measured here by the evolution of sovereign spreads, generated an 
outflow of deposits in all banks regardless their idiosyncratic indicators.10 
This situation is specially clear in the first period of the crisis (Table Nr. 2, 
column (4)), when depositors started to withdraw their funds at the same 
time that international market sentiment declined sharply, but before the 
10. It should be mentioned that although Greece has a deposit insurance system (TEK) it is not con-
sidered here as is not expected to exert positive influence on depositors since it has vulnerabilities and 
lack of credibility. In the Financial System Stability Assessment of 2006, the IMF points out that: 80% 
of TEK´s assets are invested with participated banks; the deposit insurance agency does not know the 
amounts of the insured deposits by banks and does not have access to special financing; and efficiency 
and credibility of the TEK should be strengthened.
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banking sector had to embrace the losses derived from holding Greek gov-
ernment debt. Since that moment, however, it could be considered that 
depositors began to exert a market discipline, at least by paying more at-
tention to the equity-to-asset ratio (column (5)). 
V. Robustness check
This section tests if the findings of Table Nr. 2 regarding the impact of sov-
ereign risk on depositors can be replicated using alternative country risk 
variables. There is vast evidence that macroeconomic fundamentals and 
the probability of default have statistically and economically significant 
effects on sovereign spreads. This has frequently been proved for emerg-
ing markets but more recently has also been tested for euro area countries 
like Greece (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010; Caceres, Guzzo and Segoviano, 
2010; Alogoskoufis, 2012).
As seen in Figure Nr. 1 and discussed in section III.3, there is a close 
relationship between Greek spreads and its debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus, as 
robustness check, the latter is used as the sovereign risk variable in Eq. (1): 
the independent variable SPREAD is replaced by the Government consoli-
dated gross debt as percentage of GDP extracted from Eurostat. The new 
regression is also run with a dummy that takes into account the comple-
tion of the PSI program. This dummy is called “default” as the restructur-
ing process that ended on April 2012 allowed Greece to effectively default 
on a great percentage of its debt. So, “default” takes value of 1 for the sec-
ond and third quarter of 2012 and zero otherwise. The aim here is to test if 
depositors reacted more to a key country-specific fundamental, the debt-
to-GDP ratio, than to the idiosyncratic indicators of banks, controlling for 
the default dummy and also for the interactions between this dummy and 
bank risk indicators.
These regressions are run for the pre-crisis and crisis periods, for the 
whole period with and without the interactions11 and with two sets of con-
trols: one is the same as in Table Nr. 2 and the other excludes the ratio 
“Impairment charges for credit losses to total assets”. The reason is that 
11. Interactions are not included in the crisis period so as to be comparable with the pre-crisis period, 
which cannot include the dummy of default since it does not cover the PSI progam.
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these impairments charges are strongly correlated to the government debt, 
as discussed in previous sections and presented in the correlation matrix 
in Appendix Table A.2. The relationship between impairment of assets and 
public debt is also documented in the literature. Using a panel data set of 
Greek commercial banks from 2003 to 2009, Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas 
(2012) find a positive and significant impact of public debt on all types of 
non-performing loans. Deterioration of public finances leads to increase of 
NPLs by two channels: directly by the exposure to Greek sovereign bonds 
and indirectly through austerity measures and/or decreasing demand de-
rived from the economic crisis that affects households and corporations 
solvency. 
Table Nr. 4 presents the new results which are consistent with the find-
ings of the previous section. The variable that represents the macroeco-
nomic risk has a negative and significantly effect on deposits during the 
whole period, especially in the crisis period and even after controlling for 
the default dummy. Columns (1) to (4) show that Greek depositors did 
not react to the high debt ratio until the crisis outbreak in the end of 2009. 
It is worth noting that although the dummy default is significant in 
the crisis period, for the whole period is only statistically significant af-
ter controlling for the interactions with bank risk indicators. Regarding 
these interactions, the fact that they are statistically significant (columns 
7 and 8) provides additional evidence for the conclusion of the previous 
section: with the default on part of the Greek debt and the recapitalization 
and restructuring process of the Greek banking system, depositors started 
to monitor the “new” banks and market discipline appears to be present 
through assets, liquidity and capital ratios.
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Table 4. Deposits reaction to macroeconomic risk measured by Debt 
to GDP (%) and Dummy of Default (=1 for Q2.2012 and Q3.2012)
VARIABLES 
Pre crisis Q2.2005 
-Q2.2009
Crisis Q3.2009 - 
Q3.2012
Total period. Q2.2005-Q3.2012 with 
interactions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Debt_gdp -0.001 0.001 -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004***
 [-0.214] [0.411] [-3.522] [-3.579] [-4.909] [-4.389] [-5.026] [-4.420]
Default   -0.148* -0.152*** -0.080 -0.072 -8.591*** -7.873***
   [-1.975] [-3.244] [-1.113] [-1.291] [-7.936] [-8.318]
Assets 0.757*** 0.729*** 0.804*** 0.723*** 0.819*** 0.794*** 0.864*** 0.834***
 [11.995] [10.380] [4.973] [4.631] [7.711] [7.755] [9.552] [9.327]
Equity_assets 0.016* 0.013* 0.006 0.004 0.013** 0.013** 0.013* 0.013**
 [2.031] [1.888] [0.812] [0.915] [2.348] [3.036] [2.184] [2.818]
ROAA 0.032 0.041 -0.108** -0.105** 0.053 0.048 0.085* 0.079
 [0.690] [1.138] [-2.479] [-2.585] [0.943] [0.869] [1.915] [1.741]
Liquid_assets -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003
 [-1.031] [-1.278] [-0.242] [0.495] [-0.585] [-0.385] [-0.548] [-0.363]
Impair_assets  -0.058**  -0.012** -0.009 -0.010
  [-2.521]  [-2.598] [-1.430] [-1.331]
Debt_gdp * 
Default     0.036*** 0.027**
     [4.989] [2.974]
Assets * Default     0.155*** 0.181**
     [7.082] [2.870]
Equity_assets * 
Default     0.100*** 0.111***
     [9.228] [4.416]
ROAA * Default     -0.087** -0.082
     [-2.221] [-1.574]
Liquid_assets * 
Default     0.379*** 0.410***
     [18.169] [5.932]
Impair_assets * 
Default     0.024
     [1.311]
Constant 3.555** 3.873** 3.452 4.761 2.924 3.293* 2.124 2.562
 [2.733] [2.898] [1.230] [1.778] [1.555] [1.821] [1.342] [1.636]
Observations 143 142 113 112 256 254 256 254
R-squared 0.808 0.818 0.818 0.846 0.715 0.724 0.745 0.753
Number of id 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Note: Dependent variable: Log of Deposits. Method of estimation: fixed effects with robust standard 
errors, t-statistics in brackets. *Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1%
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When including debt-to-GDP instead of spreads, the positive sign and 
significance of the asset variable do not change. The equity-to-assets ratio 
remains significant for the whole period as in Table Nr. 2 but is no longer 
significant in the crisis period when the default dummy is included.12 For 
the pre-crisis period, market discipline remains present with deposits re-
sponding positively to assets and negatively to impairment charges for 
credit losses. 
The results are also robust when: (i) adding another country specific 
fiscal variable -the general government deficit as percentage of GDP-; (ii) 
estimating by ordinary least squares method (OLS); and (iii) taking into 
account the banks’ ownership. Table A.3 in the Appendix compares col-
umns (7) and (8) of Table Nr. 4 with the results of estimating the same re-
gressions by OLS and with another specification that includes the deficit-
to-GDP ratio. In a recent paper, Caceres, Guzzo and Segoviano (2010) find 
that the overall fiscal balance is a significant factor influencing sovereign 
spreads and, specifically for the case of Greece, their results show that this 
effect is significant although not as important as the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Table A.3 presents similar evidence: when both the debt and deficit ratio 
are included in the regressions the main variable to explain the behavior 
of depositors is the debt-to-GDP ratio.
These equations are estimated by fixed effects (FE) and also by OLS. Al-
though, as previously said, it seems appropriate to estimate by FE to allow 
bank unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with independent vari-
ables, it should be noted that the most important results replicate under 
different estimation methods. The main difference between both methods 
is that without the estimation of the parameter αi, i.e. under OLS method, 
the profitability and the liquidity ratios become significant in explaining 
the behavior of depositors during the whole period.
Equation (1) is also estimated by dividing the sample according to the 
banks’ ownership type. Since the biggest banks in Greece that engaged in 
merger or acquisitions process during the present crisis were foreign, it is 
relevant to test if the depositors had the same behavior despite the owner-
12. When the default dummy is not included and the debt-to-DGP ratio replaces the variable “spread”, 
the equity-to-assets ratio does remain statistically significant for the crisis period. 
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ship of the bank. Table A.4 in the Appendix shows that depositors reacted 
to sovereign risk by withdrawing their funds in all types of banks, regard-
less their bank-specific characteristics and their ownership type. This ef-
fect is more important during the crisis but in the case of foreign banks was 
also present in the pre-crisis period (although with a lower significance). 
Regarding bank controls, and comparing between the two types of own-
ership, it seems that for foreign banks depositors exert market discipline 
through assets and profitability and in the case of public and private banks 
market discipline goes more through capitalization ratios. 
To conclude the robustness check section, a binary regression is esti-
mated to investigate how the sovereign risk, the idiosyncratic indicators 
of the banks and their type of ownership influence the probability of a 
banking crisis. The changes in bank deposits could be one way to date a 
banking crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011), thus, the crisis dummy takes 
value of 1 when the deposits of a bank fall below the deposits mean of that 
same bank. Table Nr. 5 presents the results for the probit model and the 
logit model with fixed effects (xtlogit), with and without the sovereign risk 
and including both the spread and the debt-to-GDP ratio in the last speci-
fication. Results are consistent with the previous findings: the increase in 
sovereign risk, measured by spreads or macroeconomic fundamentals, 
significantly affects the probability of a banking crisis, whereas no bank 
risk indicators or foreign ownership appear to influence the likelihood of 
the crisis.13 
13. The same results are achieved if the crisis dummy takes value of 1 when deposits of a particular bank 
fall below the mean of the total deposits, instead of falling below its own mean.
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Table Nr. 5: Probability of a banking 
crisis as a negative change in deposits
Methods of estimation: Probit and Logit with FE (Xtlogit)
Probit Xtlogit
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EQUATION VARIABLES crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
crisis Debt_gdp 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.054*** 0.044**
 [5.770] [4.451] [4.011] [2.365]
 Spread 0.084*** -0.001 0.133*** 0.043
 [3.882] [-0.037] [3.364] [0.815]
 Assets 0.049 -0.008 -0.017 -0.017 3.220*** 2.379** 0.500 0.737
 [0.589] [-0.087] [-0.197] [-0.193] [3.403] [2.341] [0.445] [0.624]
 Equity_assets -0.013 0.001 -0.017 -0.017 0.078 0.120* 0.046 0.066
 [-0.414] [0.038] [-0.513] [-0.511] [1.174] [1.710] [0.670] [0.898]
 ROAA -0.502*** -0.305* -0.116 -0.116 -0.154 -0.252 -0.181 -0.210
 [-3.207] [-1.832] [-0.663] [-0.664] [-0.295] [-0.474] [-0.348] [-0.402]
 Liquid_assets -0.015 0.051 0.046 0.046 -0.049 0.040 -0.027 -0.001
 [-0.227] [0.756] [0.688] [0.668] [-0.358] [0.286] [-0.189] [-0.004]
 Impai_assets 0.266*** 0.057 0.016 0.017 0.490*** 0.116 0.109 0.055
 [4.272] [0.728] [0.232] [0.222] [3.410] [0.775] [0.829] [0.373]
 Foreign -0.242 0.071 0.016 0.014 0.193 0.758 0.865 0.917
 [-1.217] [0.329] [0.078] [0.063] [0.155] [0.577] [0.670] [0.704]
 Constant 0.048 0.071 -4.166** -4.188**
 [0.029] [0.041] [-2.186] [-2.096]
 
 Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253
 Number of id 12 12 12 12
Note: Dependent variable: Crisis. 
Crisis takes value of 1 when deposits of a bank fall below the deposits mean of that same bank. 
As in the previous regressions, bank-specific variables are lagged one period. T-statistics are in 
brackets. *Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1.
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VI. Conclusions
This case study analyzes the behavior of Greek depositors since its entry 
to the Euro-area until the present financial crisis. The main finding, consis-
tent with the work of Levy-Yeyati, Martínez Peria and Schmukler (2010), 
is that depositors react to macroeconomic risk and this effect increases 
during the crisis period. The results presented here are also consistent 
with the market discipline literature, which highlights the discipline that 
depositors exert mainly through assets and equity-to-assets ratio. On the 
other hand, depositors do not usually react to measures of assets quality as 
also documented in papers like Berger and Turk-Ariss (2010).
The main contribution of this paper is to present empirical evidence 
regarding the influence of sovereign risk on depositors’ behavior for the 
case of a non-emerging market. It suggests that the sovereign systemic 
risk that usually determines a county’s level of development is associ-
ated with the expectations and credibility it transmits and it shows how 
this risk can negatively affects the domestic economy. At the outbreak 
of the crisis Greece was classified as a developed country; however, 
in June 2013 it was downgraded to an emerging market status. Greece 
was classified as developed although: i) its fiscal and external situation 
seemed to be unsustainable during the whole period and ii) when the 
international crisis of 2009 unraveled it was the first sovereign to find 
itself in a confidence crisis even though the fiscal situation worsened in 
other countries much more than in Greece. Ultimately, as concluded by 
Alogoskoufis (2012) the Greek crisis “is not simply a debt crisis; it is a 
dual confidence crisis, due to the mismanagement of the expectations 
of international creditors and domestic consumers and investors.” At a 
local scale, this loss of confidence negatively impacted on the banking 
system as Greek depositors decided to withdraw their funds despite the 
fact that it showed sound liquidity and solvency indicators, at least when 
the crisis started.
The major limitation of this empirical investigation is the number of 
observations, especially in the case of deposits. The ideal database would 
have been a daily series of bank-level deposits in order to see how deposi-
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tors behave in smaller time frames according to each bank,14 but the bank-
level information was only available on a quarterly basis. Nevertheless, 
even with relative few observations, results are robust to different vari-
ables of macroeconomic risk and different estimation methods.
As final remarks, what this investigation suggests in broad terms is that 
governments should do everything they can to be credible and to avoid the 
mismanagement of expectations. In terms of policy conclusions, these re-
sults along with the findings of Levy-Yeyati, Martínez Peria and Schmuk-
ler (2010) emphasize the importance of supervision of the fundamental 
variables of the economy and, in particular, the importance of limit the 
exposure of banks to macroeconomic risk. The Greek case shows how the 
whole banking system can be compromised as a result of macroeconomic 
imbalances, not only coming from the financial area but also from the fis-
cal or external sector, and how theses imbalances might be overlooked un-
til a confidence crisis puts them under the spotlight. The sharp increase in 
government debt needed to finance the fiscal imbalances generated a bulk 
of Government Greek bonds held in local banks that, in addition to the 
worsening conditions of private debtors, ended with the restructuring and 
recapitalization of banks. Before these losses materialized on banks finan-
cial statements, depositors had already started to withdraw their funds, 
simply because of increased uncertainty and declined market sentiment. 
In turn, these withdrawals negatively reinforced the banks delicate situa-
tion by decreasing their funding and liquidity, generating a vicious circle 
that perhaps could have been avoided if the macroeconomic situation had 
been controlled some years ago.
14. For instance, Burdisso, Cohen Sabban and D´Amato (2003) show how the dynamic of deposits can 
change in small time frames, responding in different ways to the size and ownership of the banks, by 
exploiting the richness of a daily panel data set of individual bank’s deposits.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Greek banks included in the database and significant events 
(M&A, changes in ownership, etc.) that occurred during the sample 
period June 2005- September 2012.
Commercial Banks Ownership or M&A dealings
Agricultural Bank of Greece -ATEbank Acquired by Piraeus Bank SA in July 2012.
Alpha Bank -
Attica Bank -
Emporiki Bank of Greece* Became a subsidiary of Credit Agricole SA in 2006.
Eurobank Ergasias 
Changed its name from Eurobank EFG to Eurobank Ergasias 
SA in August 2012.
General Bank of Greece - GENIKI* -
Marfin Egnatia Bank 
Egnatia Bank SA absorbed Laiki Bank (Hellas) SA and 
Marfin Bank and changed its name in June 2007.
National Bank of Greece -
PRObank -
Piraeus Bank In July 2012 absorbed Agricultural Bank of Greece.
Proton Bank
Proton Investment Bank absorbed Omega Bank SA and Proton 
Securities and changed its name to Proton Bank in September 
2006.
In October 2011, Proton Bank was resolved and its banking 
license withdrawn. By decision of the Ministry of Finance 
and with state aid, a new legal entity was created to rescue its 
activities, New Proton Bank SA (a so called “bridge bank”).
TT Hellenic Postbank *2 In December 2011 absorbed T Bank SA.
Notes:* Emporiki and GENIKI were acquired by Alpha Bank and Piraeus Bank, 
respectively, but the transactions finalized between the end 
of 2012 and 2013 so the mergers are not included in the sample period.
*2 In January 2013, a newly established bank -“New Hellenic Postbank”- was capitalized by the 
Hellenic Financial Stability Fund, which will be its sole shareholder.
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Table A.2: Correlation matrix.
 Spread Debt_
gdp
Default Assets Eq_asset Imp_asset ROAA
Liq_
asset Foreign
Spread 1.000        
Debt_
gdp
0.796* 1.000       
Default 0.525* 0.326* 1.000      
Assets 0.153* 0.147* 0.141* 1.000     
Equity_
assets -0.235* -0.161* -0.133* -0.416* 1.000    
Impair_
assets 0.680* 0.521* 0.463* -0.089 -0.302* 1.000   
ROAA -0.133* -0.272* -0.290* -0.225* -0.083 0.117* 1,000  
Liquid_
assets -0.159* -0.158* -0.199* -0.010 -0.069 -0.011 0.198* 1.000
Foreign 0.047* 0.036 0.025 0.020 0.062* 0.215* -0.077* -0.146* 1.000
Note: This table presents the correlation between regressors included in Eq. (1) and the alternative 
measures of risk (spreads, debt, default) for the period June 2005-September 2012. The star means the 
correlation is significant at 1%. Bank-level variables are lagged one period. Default takes value of 1 for 
Q2.2012 and Q3.2012 and zero otherwise.
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Table A.3: Robustness check with Debt-to-GDP, 
Deficit-to-GDP and Default and estimating by FE and OLS
VARIABLES 
FE OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Debt_gdp -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003***
[-5.026] [-4.420] [-4.920] [-4.301] [-7.374] [-4.175] [-7.469] [-4.365]
Deficit 0.002 0.003* 0.003 0.003
[1.781] [1.822] [1.137] [0.959]
Default -8.591*** -7.873*** -7.623*** -6.893*** -2.063 -1.541*** -1.029 -0.687
[-7.936] [-8.318] [-5.609] [-5.902] [-0.762] [-3.344] [-0.361] [-0.695]
Assets 0.864*** 0.834*** 0.843*** 0.813*** 0.954*** 0.941*** 0.955*** 0.942***
 [9.552] [9.327] [9.603] [9.406] [102.837] [96.640] [104.434] [98.133]
Equity_assets 0.013* 0.013** 0.012* 0.012** 0.006 0.001 0.006* 0.001
 [2.184] [2.818] [2.149] [2.833] [1.638] [0.170] [1.684] [0.237]
ROAA 0.085* 0.079 0.092* 0.086* 0.166*** 0.186*** 0.173*** 0.192***
 [1.915] [1.741] [2.026] [1.848] [8.586] [9.156] [8.168] [8.674]
Liquid_assets -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023** 0.023***
 [-0.548] [-0.363] [-0.657] [-0.473] [2.597] [2.799] [2.591] [2.786]
Impair_assets -0.010 -0.010 -0.039*** -0.038***
 [-1.331] [-1.341] [-5.183] [-5.118]
Debt_gdp * Default 0.036*** 0.027** 0.030*** 0.021* 0.037*** -0.000 0.030** -0.006
[4.989] [2.974] [3.558] [1.931] [3.338] [-0.057] [2.425] [-0.784]
Assets * Default 0.155*** 0.181** 0.149*** 0.175** -0.215*** 0.045 -0.217*** 0.044
 [7.082] [2.870] [6.603] [2.876] [-2.870] [1.158] [-2.885] [1.122]
Equity_assets * Default 0.100*** 0.111*** 0.098*** 0.109*** -0.018 0.090*** -0.019 0.090***
 [9.228] [4.416] [8.804] [4.442] [-0.617] [5.804] [-0.621] [5.776]
ROAA * Default -0.087** -0.082 -0.088** -0.084 0.017 -0.087*** 0.010 -0.093***
 [-2.221] [-1.574] [-2.228] [-1.576] [0.484] [-3.846] [0.264] [-3.824]
Liquid_assets * Default 0.379*** 0.410*** 0.375*** 0.408*** 0.052 0.310*** 0.052 0.310***
 [18.169] [5.932] [17.741] [5.983] [0.650] [7.600] [0.650] [7.586]
Impair_assets * Default 0.024 0.024 0.118*** 0.118***
[1.311] [1.323] [11.933] [11.876]
Constant 2.124 2.562 2.435 2.883* 0.364* 0.380** 0.311 0.338*
[1.342] [1.636] [1.583] [1.902] [1.910] [1.983] [1.645] [1.760]
Observations 256 254 256 254 256 254 256 254
R-squared 0.745 0.753 0.748 0.756 0.977 0.978 0.977 0.979
Number of id 12 12 12 12     
Note: Dependent variable is Log of Deposits. Variable Deficit is the ratio of Government Net Borrowing 
as percentage of GDP taken from Eurostat. Methods of estimation: fixed effects (FE) and ordinary least 
squares (OLS) with robust standard errors, t-statistics in brackets. *Significant at 10% **Significant 
at 5% ***Significant at 1%.
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Table A.4: Robustness check. Foreign vs. No Foreign Banks in Greece
 If foreign==1 If foreign==0
 Total period Pre-crisis Crisis Total period Pre-crisis Crisis
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ldep ldep ldep ldep ldep ldep
       
Spread -0.024** -0.089* -0.015** -0.008*** 0.015 -0.009**
 [-5.551] [-2.957] [-4.406] [-4.120] [0.824] [-2.531]
Assets 0.748** 1.057*** 0.902** 0.616*** 0.660*** 0.643**
 [3.586] [7.240] [5.535] [8.510] [13.609] [3.187]
Equity_assets -0.017 -0.005 0.001 0.011*** 0.012* 0.010**
 [-1.156] [-0.556] [0.172] [4.777] [2.178] [3.122]
Impair_assets 0.002 0.016 0.007 -0.001 -0.070 0.004
 [0.270] [0.856] [2.035] [-0.110] [-1.765] [1.086]
ROAA 0.163* 0.137** -0.067 -0.085** -0.029 -0.067
 [2.524] [5.272] [-0.743] [-2.651] [-1.025] [-1.721]
Liquid_assets 0.008 0.015 0.007 -0.005 -0.010 -0.006
 [0.751] [1.563] [0.865] [-0.927] [-1.172] [-1.148]
Constant 3.466 -1.703 1.061 6.134*** 5.331*** 5.612
 [0.932] [-0.665] [0.366] [4.966] [6.180] [1.658]
     
Observations 77 42 35 177 100 77
R-squared 0.820 0.919 0.943 0.806 0.838 0.802
Number of banks 4 4 4 10 9 9
Note: The dependent variable is the log of deposits. Bank-specific variables are taken from Greek banks 
quarterly financial statements and lagged one period. Columns (1) to (3) are regressions for foreign 
banks and columns (4) to (6) present the result for not foreign banks (public and private). In each 
case, regressions are estimated for the whole period and for the two subsamples: pre-crisis and crisis, 
defined as in Table 2. Method of estimation is fixed effects and standard errors are robust. The sum of 
the number of banks may not be the same as the total number of banks in Table 2 because some of them 
changed ownership during the whole period, so may be included in both types of ownership according 
to the period to be analyzed. T-statistics are in brackets. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, 
***Significant at 1%.
